Socratic Wisdom

Philosophy and the Return to 

Self-Knowledge 

by Donald Phillip Verene

"Socrates was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens."

--- Cicero

This is a book dedicated to the importance of and need to return philosophy to an approach found in the origins of philosophy found in Socratic humanism. This means reviving the ideal espoused in the slogan "know thyself". The examined life and the wisdom derived from the search and process of achieving such a life is one that the author believes is necessary to reform philosophy. He is careful to comment on process and in the concluding sections of the book provide a discussion of virtues. As a student of the classics and someone who admires the Socratic process of seeking knowledge through dialogic means I found this book encouraging and thought-provoking.

Convention versus Nature

Cratylus/Parmenides/Greater 

Hippias/Lesser Hippias 

by Plato

"there is an ancient saying, that 'hard is the knowledge of the good.'  And the knowledge of names is a great part of knowledge.  If I had not been poor, I might have heard the fifty-drachma course of the great Prodicus, which is a complete education in grammar and language--these are his own words--and then I should have been at once able to answer your question about the correctness of names.  But, indeed, I have only heard the single-drachma course, and therefore, I do not know the truth about such matters; I will, however, gladly assist you and Cratylus in the investigation of them.  When he declares that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is only making fun of you;--he means to say that you are no true son of Hermes, because you are always looking after a fortune and never in luck.  But, as I was saying, there is a good deal of difficulty in this sort of knowledge, and therefore we had better leave the question open until we have heard both sides." - Plato, Cratylus


This volume of Plato's works served as one of the sources for reading and discussion in a class on both Plato's philosophy and the nature of Words in the Basic Program of Liberal Education of The University of Chicago. 

The formal topic of the Cratylus is ‘correctness of names’, a hot topic in the late fifth century BC when the dialogue has its dramatic setting. Sophists like Prodicus offered training courses in this subject, sometimes perhaps meaning by it little more than lessons in correct diction. But that practical issue spawned the theoretical question, what criteria determine the correct choice of name for any given object? And in the Cratylus Socrates' two primary interlocutors, Hermogenes and Cratylus (the latter of whom is reported by Aristotle to have been an early philosophical influence on Plato), represent two diametrically opposed answers to that question. It was particularly interesting to see the defense, by Plato, of an objective view as opposed to the relativism of the Sophists. 

The positions of Hermogenes and Cratylus have come to be known to modern scholarship as ‘conventionalism’ and ‘naturalism’ respectively. An extreme linguistic conventionalist like Hermogenes holds that nothing but local or national convention determines which words are used to designate which objects. The same names could have been attached to quite different objects, and the same objects given quite different names, so long as the users of the language were party to the convention. Cratylus, as an extreme linguistic naturalist, holds that names cannot be arbitrarily chosen in the way that conventionalism describes or advocates, because names belong naturally to their specific objects. If you try to speak of something with any name other than its natural name, you are simply failing to refer to it at all. For example, he has told Hermogenes to the latter's intense annoyance, Hermogenes is not actually his name.

Socrates is the main speaker in this dialogue, and his arguments are generally taken to represent Plato's own current views. He starts out by criticizing conventionalism, and persuades Hermogenes that some kind of naturalism must be endorsed. In the final part of the dialogue Socrates turns to Cratylus and shows him that his expectations as a naturalist are set impossibly high: names cannot aspire to being perfect encapsulations of their objects' essences, and some  element of convention must be conceded.

This is one of the dialogues that reminded me of the integral connections between Plato and Aristotle in Greek philosophy.  Combined with readings of Hamlet and The Adventures of Alice in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, this class took on an ambiance and an aura that I have never forgotten (especially since it occurred more than two decades ago). The importance of words and the source of their meaning took on a new perspective as we discussed the use of language by these authors in light of Plato's philosophical dialogue.

Seeking Understanding

Tallyho - The Hunt for Virtue: Beauty, Truth and Goodness: Nine Dialogues by Plato: Phaedrus, Lysis, Protagoras, Charmides, Parmenides, Gorgias, Theatetus, Meno, and Sophist 
by Phillip Lundberg



"Bethink yourself, now, Theaetetus, that in a more prudent manner you won't beleive to know what you don't know.  For only to this extent is my art capable and of nothing more, no too do I understand anything like the others, thses great men of the present and of former times, those who are so worthy of marvel.  But this artistry of midwifery, this my profession was imparted both to me and to my mother from God"(210d, p458)




This is a refreshing new translation of nine of Plato's most important dialogues. The dialogues include Phaedrus, Protagoras, and Gorgias among others.

An informative introduction provides both explanations and a defense for the selection and, most importantly, describes the unique nature of these translations. The dialogues are all translated from the classic German translation of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) . According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy "Schleiermacher's translations appeared during the period 1804-28 (though not all of the dialogues were translated in the end), and are still widely used and admired today."
Not only does the translator use Schleiermacher's translations as his source, he recommends and defends Schleiermacher's unorthodox categorization of Plato's dialogues which places Phaedrus and Parmenides in the first of three groupings with The Republic relegated to the third.

The dialogues are engaging and readable in this modern translation that benefits from using the German as its source rather than the original ancient Greek. This reader found the sectional introductions to each dialogue helpful, while judicious use of footnotes provided connections between dialogues of key ideas. The translation was used by our literary study group profitably as a source for a lively discussion of Plato's philosophy, Socrates as presented by Plato, and the importance of philosophy for our lives. Overall I would recommend this selection of dialogues with its unique translation, to all readers interested in enhancing their understanding of Plato's thought.

A Commonplace Entry

Phaedrus



“Only a philosopher's mind grows wings, since its memory always keeps it as close as possible to those realities by being close to which the gods are divine.”  ― Plato, Phaedrus







"Phaedrus: . . . But let’s be going, since now even the stifling heat is more gentle.

Socrates: Shouldn’t we pray to the gods here before going?

Phaedrus: Yes, surely.

Socrates: Dear Pan and ye other gods who dwell here, grant that I may become beautiful within and that my worldly belongings be in accord with my inner self. May I consider the wise man rich and have only as much gold as a moderate man can carry and use.

Is there anything else we need, Phaedrus? For me, our prayer was said with due measure.

Phaedrus: Make it a prayer for me, too. Friends have things in common.

Socrates: Let’s be going."

That is ending of the Phaedrus.   Here we find the beauty of a friendship portrayed eloquently. Plato assures us that they have indeed, not just in story, shared “with due measure” an outpouring of divinity together; Socrates offers this noble prayer that the beauty of soul they have turned round and round in their talking may be theirs, but Phaedrus completes, perfects the prayer making it also his own, showing in this small but decisive way that he has accepted Socrates’ offer of love, and will share the poverty and riches of his rhetoric, to guide and stir each other on the way to truth. “ἴωμεν” — “Let’s be going.” They have this way reached an agreement with each other and with themselves; they have arrived where now their conversation something holds in common, something divine. And more talk is no longer needful. “Is there anything else we need Phaedrus?” Nothing else, but to take the double riches of sharing the best things with one you love.


"Phaedrus" from the Dialogues of Plato.

A Discourse on some Platonic Dialogues

Discovering Plato 
by Alexandre Koyré


"The reader would like nothing better than to learn the answers to the problems placed before him by Socrates.  But those answers are just what Socrates most often denies him.  The dialogues, at least the so-called Socratic dialogues, the only ones which will concern us here, leave us up in the air.  The discussion ends upon a note of impotence with an avowal of ignorance." ( p 1)



This short book includes much more "food for thought" than many tomes more than twice its' size. Alexandre Koyre demonstrates an incisive erudition in his commentary on four of Plato's greatest dialogues; these include the Meno, the Theatetus, the Protagoras, and the Republic. The Republic takes up about half of the short book presenting a focus on politics and on the just city.

Beginning with the lesson from the Meno that virtue is not taught, but it can be taught. The same subject is discussed in the Protagoras, yet in a different and, according to Koyre, more amusing way. The further discussions of Theatetus and Republic are equally inviting and challenging as far as they go.  They suggest ways we may conceive of knowledge and elucidate how theory and action may work in combination in both philosophy and politics.  Is there such a thing as a just city?  This book provides direction toward how to think about this and other topics.  Ultimately it is a good introduction to both the philosophy of Plato and the acute analytical thought of Alexandre Koyre. The result is both invigorating and engaging for the reader.


View all my reviews

Serendipity

Xenophon and Sterne

Last weekend serendipity (the faculty or phenomenon of finding valuable or agreeable things not sought for; also : an instance of this.) struck with the correspondence between a First Friday lecture "On the Socratic Xenophon" and a reading discussion Sunday morning of Tristram Shandy (Volume 2, Chapter XLVIII).  What you may ask do these two events share in common?  Well first I will briefly discuss the First Friday lecture and then conclude with an answer based on our reading of Sterne' Tristram.

The Lecture:

On Friday last George Anastaplo, Instructor in the Basic Program of Liberal Education for Adults at the University of Chicago, lectured "On the Socratic Xenophon".  He opened with a comparison of Xenophon's portrait of Socrates in his "The Apology of Socrates" and "The Memorabilia" with Plato's portrayal of Socrates in his own "Apology of Socrates".  Mr. Anastaplo conjectured that Xenophon, had he been present, could have persuaded the jury to not convict Socrates.  Xenophon's portrait of Socrates appears less offensive to the cultural norms of the jurors with a practical concern for everyday activities that does not appear in the Platonic portrayal.  Most importantly this reflected Xenophon's own reverence for the gods of Athens.  There are similarities between the two portraits including the presence of Socrates's "daimon".  Notable also is the importance for practical education in Xenophon's portrait of Socrates.  Again there appears a distinction between the Platonic Socrates who questioned to the point of disturbing many, Athenians about their possession of wisdom and the Socrates of Xenophon's writing who did not appear nearly as radical in his activities.  The distinction makes one wonder if the Socrates of Xenophon would reasonably be condemned to death.  On the other hand, as noted in Mr. Anastaplo's introductory remarks for the lecture, it was a wonder that the Socrates of Plato's Apology survived "into his seventieth year" with his critical questioning of Athenians as he was spurred on by the pronouncement of the Oracle at Delphi.
The lecture raised questions and successfully, for this listener, suggested further reading an thought is warranted on these and other aspects of Socrates' life and thought.

Tristram Shandy

To my surprise on Sunday morning as we discussed our continuing reading of The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman by Laurence Sterne we encountered the following statement:
"The first thing which entered my father’s head […] was to sit down coolly, after the example of Xenophon, and write a TRISTRA-poedia, or system of education for me…" (Vol 2, p 144).
Yes. Tristram was describing his father's attempt to collect "his own scattered thoughts, counsels, and notions", to provide an "Institute" for his education through childhood and adolescence.  This activity demonstrated some of that sort of practical advice that represents the Xenophon who was described so eloquently in the lecture I had attended only two days earlier.  Just as Walter Shandy had studied Xenophon and chose to pass on some of his wisdom to his son Tristram we too may continue to benefit from the lessons of this Greek author and thinker.  It is for me an example of serendipitous listening and reading and, hopefully, learning from the great writers of Western culture.

Tristram Shandy by Laurence Sterne. Everyman's Library, 1991 (1768)

Socrates and Virtue

Notes on Plato's Alcibiades and Meno

Near the end of Plato's dialogue, Alcibiades, the following exchange occurs:

"Socrates:  Again, in a ship, if a man were at liberty to do what he chose, but were devoid of mind and excellence in navigation, do you perceive what must happen to him and his fellow-sailors?

Alcibiades:  I do: they must all perish.

Socrates:  And in just the same way, if a state, or any office or authority, is lacking in excellence or virtue, it will be overtaken by failure?

Alcibiades:  It must.

Socrates:  Then it is not despotic power, my admirable Alcibiades, that you ought to secure either to yourself or to the state, if you would be happy, but virtue.

Alcibiades:  That is true." (Alcibiades I, 135a-b)

In this dialogue we see Socrates leading Alcibiades, for whom he is the last lover standing, through a discussion of the importance of self-control to the role of virtue in the pursuit of the happiness for the individual or the city.  Socrates sees the possibility of Alcibiades learning this even as Alcibiades is on the verge of entering the political arena completely unprepared.  

There is a theme that is shared by this dialogue and Plato's Meno.  It is the view of knowing as a process.  The process is elucidated through the Socratic dialectic method that demonstrates to Meno that :

"if the truth of all things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at the present--that is, what you do not remember--you must endeavor to search out and recollect?" (Meno, 86b)

The focus is on the search, the process by which we come to knowledge.  This is connected as well with the key importance of self-control:

"Socrates: And can we find any part of the soul that we can call more divine than this, which is the seat of knowledge and thought?

Alcibiades: We cannot.

Socrates: Then this part of her resembles god, and whoever looks at this , and comes to know all that is divine, will gain thereby the best knowledge of himself.

Alcibiades: Apparently.

Socrates: And self-knowledge we admitted to be temperance.

Alcibiades: To be sure." (Alcibiades I, 133c)

In both the dialogues, Meno and Alcibiades,  Plato presents the Socrates that "does not know".  The dialogues are indeterminate and the reader is left without a resolution to the question under discussion.  In Meno this question is stated in the opening when Meno asks if virtue can be taught.  Of course, in the dialogue Socrates leads Meno to the underlying question which must be answered first: namely, what is virtue?  But neither question is answered by the end even though we can learn from the process.  Consider these dialogues as signs of the nature of Socrates and virtue.

Meno in Plato II, translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library, 1990 (1924).
Alcibiades in Plato XII, translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Loeb Classical Library, 1986 (1927)

Plato's Dramatic Art

The Several Portraits of Socrates

"I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons or your properties, but and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money, but that from virtue comes money and every other good of man, public as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, I am a mischievous person."  -  Socrates, quoted by Plato, 'The Death of Socrates'

Who was Socrates?  He died in 399 BC and according to Plato and Xenophon there was a trial at which he was condemned to death.  But there are no writings of Socrates for he never wrote down anything.  The result is we must rely on the picture of Socrates drawn by Aristophanes, Plato, and Xenophon.  In the Clouds Aristophanes portrayed Socrates as a teacher who charged fees for instruction, taught a variety of subjects including rhetoric, and disbelieved in the traditional gods.  All of this is denied in the description of Socrates in Plato and that of by Xenophon.  Aristophanes comic portrait, which was the only one produced contemporaneously with Socrates own life, is one that seems slanted to meet the satirical comic ends of the playwright.  In spite of this, if we believe Plato's description of the relationship of Aristophanes and Socrates in his Symposium they appeared to be friends.  While some claim that Aristophanes' portrait of Socrates was based on hostility I would side with those (scholars like G. Murray) who suggest it was based on pure comedy.  The play as a whole still retains comic elements that twenty-first century readers can and do enjoy.
More interesting in my recent reading is the portrait of Socrates that one may glean from the dialogues of Plato.  The familiar saying of Socrates is that he only knows that he does not know anything.  And he spends his time refuting his dialectical partners who claim to know something.  This usually leads to the result that they admit they do not know what they claimed to, but also usually leaves the reader in the dark as the dialogue ends without any resolution or answer to the questions posed by Socrates.  This occurs repeatedly with unsuccessful attempts to define temperance (Charmides), courage (Laches), or friendship (Lysis).  It is surprising when, in a reading of the Gorgias, the reader finds a different Socrates who does claim to know several things.  It is here, in the Gorgias, that we see Plato's own dramatic art at work, molding a new and improved Socrates to perform in a way that will display, perhaps, the views of Plato himself.
Plato's dramatic art is not unlike that of a playwright and several dialogues, including the Gorgias, have a dramatic progression and contain crises as plays do.  The Gorgias as a whole can be seen as a fine example of Plato's art in the form of a dramatic progression.  There are three perfectly connected episodes:  Socrates' three conversations with Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.  Gorgias, the famous sophist, seeing  only the technical side of the orators' training, is incapable of giving his art any moral purpose.  Polus will not use rhetoric for an evil end but only because he is timid and respects prejudices.  But let a violent person like Callicles come along:  he will find in the school of Gorgias not a restraint, but an instrument for the expression of his violence.  In this fashion all consequences of the intellectual attitude of Gorgias are developed in a living and dramatic manner.  Interestingly, Plato ends the Gorgias with one of the famous myths that appear and reappear throughout the dialogues (Symposium, Phaedo, Phaedrus, and Republic to name a few).  They do not always appear in the mouth of Socrates, but at the end of the Gorgias it is Socrates himself who says to Callicles:
"Give an ear then, as they say, to a right fine story, which you will regard as a fable, I fancy, but I as an actual account;  for what I am about to tell you I mean to offer as the truth." (523a)
Socrates goes on to present a treatise of a sort that comments on the destiny of the soul, giving the dialogue a foundation that in retrospect it seemed to be aiming at the whole time.

Gorgias by Plato, W. R. M. Lamb, trans. Loeb Classical Library, 1925
Clouds by Aristophanes, Peter Meineck, trans. Hackett Publishing, 1998
Aristophanes by G. Murray. Oxford, 1933

Two Views on Writing

"A Writing Lesson"

Writing is a strange invention. One might suppose that its emergence cold not fail to bring about profound changes in the conditions of human existence, and that these transformations must of necessity be of an intellectual nature.  The possession of writing vastly increases man's ability to preserve knowledge.  It can be thought of as an artificial memory, the development of which ought to lead to a clearer awareness of the past, and hence to a greater ability to organize both the present and the future.  After eliminating all other criteria which have been put forward to distinguish between barbarism and civilization, it is tempting to retain this one at least:  there are peoples with, or without, writing ;  the former are able to store up their past achievements and to move with ever-increasing rapidity towards the goal they have set themselves. whereas the latter, being incapable of remembering the past beyond the narrow margin of individual memory, seem bound to remain imprisoned in a fluctuating history which will always lack both a beginning and any lasting awareness of an aim.

Claude Levi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques, "A Writing Lesson", p 298.

__________________________________

Plato, The Phaedrus 

– a dialogue between Socrates and Phaedrus written down by the pupil of Socrates, Plato, in approximately 370 BC.

Soc. Enough appears to have been said by us of a true and false art of speaking.

Phaedr. Certainly.

Soc. But there is something yet to be said of propriety and impropriety of writing.

Phaedr. Yes.

Soc. Do you know how you can speak or act about rhetoric in a manner which will be acceptable to God?

Phaedr. No, indeed. Do you?

Soc. I have heard a tradition of the ancients, whether true or not they only know; although if we had found the truth ourselves, do you think that we should care much about the opinions of men?

Phaedr. Your question needs no answer; but I wish that you would tell me what you say that you have heard.

Soc. At the Egyptian city of Naucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was Theuth; the bird which is called the Ibis is sacred to him, and he was the inventor of many arts, such as arithmetic and calculation and geometry and astronomy and draughts and dice, but his great discovery was the use of letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country of Egypt; and he dwelt in that great city of Upper Egypt which the Hellenes call Egyptian Thebes, and the god himself is called by them Ammon. To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might be allowed to have the benefit of them; he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about their several uses, and praised some of them and censured others, as he approved or disapproved of them. It would take a long time to repeat all that Thamus said to Theuth in praise or blame of the various arts. But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, the parent or inventor of an art is not always the best judge of the utility or inutility of his own inventions to the users of them. And in this instance, you who are the father of letters, from a paternal love of your own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this discovery of yours will create forgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth; they will be hearers of many things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the show of wisdom without the reality.

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.

Soc. There was a tradition in the temple of Dodona that oaks first gave prophetic utterances. The men of old, unlike in their simplicity to young philosophy, deemed that if they heard the truth even from "oak or rock," it was enough for them; whereas you seem to consider not whether a thing is or is not true, but who the speaker is and from what country the tale comes.

Phaedr. I acknowledge the justice of your rebuke; and I think that the Theban is right in his view about letters.

Soc. He would be a very simple person, and quite a stranger to the oracles of Thamus or Ammon, who should leave in writing or receive in writing any art under the idea that the written word would be intelligible or certain; or who deemed that writing was at all better than knowledge and recollection of the same matters?

Phaedr. That is most true.

Soc. I cannot help feeling, Phaedrus, that writing is unfortunately like painting; for the creations of the painter have the attitude of life, and yet if you ask them a question they preserve a solemn silence. And the same may be said of speeches. You would imagine that they had intelligence, but if you want to know anything and put a question to one of them, the speaker always gives one unvarying answer. And when they have been once written down they are tumbled about anywhere among those who may or may not understand them, and know not to whom they should reply, to whom not: and, if they are maltreated or abused, they have no parent to protect them; and they cannot protect or defend themselves.

Phaedr. That again is most true.

Soc. Is there not another kind of word or speech far better than this, and having far greater power-a son of the same family, but lawfully begotten?

Phaedr. Whom do you mean, and what is his origin?

Soc. I mean an intelligent word graven in the soul of the learner, which can defend itself, and knows when to speak and when to be silent. 
Phaedr. You mean the living word of knowledge which has a soul, and of which written word is properly no more than an image? 
Soc. Yes, of course that is what I mean. And now may I be allowed to ask you a question: Would a husbandman, who is a man of sense, take the seeds, which he values and which he wishes to bear fruit, and in sober seriousness plant them during the heat of summer, in some garden of Adonis, that he may rejoice when he sees them in eight days appearing in beauty? at least he would do so, if at all, only for the sake of amusement and pastime. But when he is in earnest he sows in fitting soil, and practises husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months the seeds which he has sown arrive at perfection?

Phaedr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only in play.

Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honourable has less understanding, than the husbandman, about his own seeds?

Phaedr. Certainly not.

Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to "write" his thoughts "in water" with pen and ink, sowing words which can neither speak for themselves nor teach the truth adequately to others?

Phaedr. No, that is not likely.

Soc. No, that is not likely-in the garden of letters he will sow and plant, but only for the sake of recreation and amusement; he will write them down as memorials to be treasured against the forgetfulness of old age, by himself, or by any other old man who is treading the same path. He will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and while others are refreshing their souls with banqueting and the like, this will be the pastime in which his days are spent.

Thoughts for Life

The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations

 by Robert Nozick

"The activities of a life are infused by examination, not just affected by it, and their character is different when permeated by the results of concentrated reflection." - Robert Nozick, The Examined Life, p 14.


Of all of Robert Nozick's books that I have read this is the one to which I return most frequently. He displays a depth of thought, references to other thinkers, and a prose style which I find inviting. That is I am spurred to think about how and why I agree or disagree with the author, but more importantly find the process of reading him a catalyst for my own thinking. 
 Happiness is just one of the subjects essayed in this book but it is a good example as when you encounter Nozick saying:
"And although it might be best of all to be Socrates satisfied, having both happiness and depth, we would give up some happiness in order to gain the depth."(p 102) And I would add parenthetically, of an examined life. The breadth of the book is astounding, from death to love to meaning and value in life, and more. The discussion of "great spiritual teachers" in the essay "Giving Everything Its Due"(p 253-266) is a good example of thinking beyond the typical teacher as example by contrasting the value of leading a comparatively more "balanced life" as compared to the singularity of the great teachers. I continue to find further stimulus to thought, just as in other great books, when I return to this collection of imaginative and analytical essays that both explore and examine of what it means to aspire to live a humane life.  

He discusses the view of Socrates that the examined life is not worth living in the introduction and concludes:

"I do not say with Socrates that the unexamined life is not worth living--that is unnecessarily harsh.  However, when we guide our lives by our own pondered thoughts, it is then our life that we are living, not someone else's.  In this sense, the unexamined life is not lived as fully."(p 15)


The Examined Life by Robert Nozick.  Simon and Schuster, 1989.

Philosophical Notes

Fragments from the Notebooks

Notes on the Phaedrus of Plato

What did Plato set out to accomplish when he wrote the dialogue we know as the Phaedrus? There, in the myths of both Socrates and ____, we find erotic dreams of an allegorical nature about our relation to the world and the nature of that world. It is these myths that hold the key to one facet of Plato's metaphysics -- a metaphysics that links us with the world and the surrounding universe. Can that metaphysics be connected with or reconciled to that of Aristotle? What place or role does objectivity play in it? Perhaps this excursion into the dialogue and beyond will show us the way toward objectivity and being.


The demonstration of existence in the dialogues of Plato, particularly the Phaedrus, can be seen if we consider briefly the typical situation presented in many of the dialogues. This is where there are one or more interlocutors engaged in a discussion of a particular philosophical topic by Socrates. This is the case in the Phaedrus where we find Phaedrus and walking outside the city of Athens. . . .


What does man's quest for perfection consist of when, as Plato writes in the Phaedrus, only god can have the necessary wisdom (to understand perfection)? Socrates, in reply to Phaedrus' question gives us an answer concerning man's quest:


To call him wise, Phaedrus, would, I think be going to far; the epithet is proper only to a god. A name that would fit him better, and have more seemliness, would be "lover of wisdom". (Phaedrus, 278d)


Man to seek perfection must be a lover of wisdom, or philosopher. It is the philosopher who will come closest to knowledge and thus to the idea, god (or the Good). Man must continually exert an effort to combat his ignorance and strive for the achievement of this ideal. This point, in particular, emphasizes the importance of Plato's conception of god for his belief in the dichotomy between body and soul. . . . 

What is Reason?

Reflections upon a Socratic Weekend

We shall not cease from exploration

And the end of all our exploring

Will be to arrive where we started

And know the place for the first time.

- T. S. Eliot

I spent the past weekend, from Thursday evening through Sunday morning, exploring the question: "What is Reason?" with sixteen other individuals who came together under the auspices of the Reason Individualism Freedom Institute to engage in a Socratic dialogue regarding this and related questions. I came away from this weekend, not with answers to the question, but with a better understanding of how to explore this and related questions of fundamental importance for anyone interested in pursuing wisdom.

We came together on Thursday evening, each from different places, backgrounds and ways of life, but each also with common goals and an beneficent spirit of cooperation centered on an agreement that reason was a concept worth exploring. There were several opportunities to do just that as we attempted with increasing success, led by Marsha Enright, the founder of the RIF Institute and Andrew Humphries, to follow the principles of Socratic dialogue in examining texts from Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Ayn Rand, Jefferson and others. The spirit of friendly cooperation in pursuit of understanding each of these texts drove us forward and we shared our observations on the success of each attempt before moving on. Between the discussions we expanded our minds with consideration of the great architecture of Chicago and the interpretation and observation of important works of art in the Art Institute. We also enjoyed a presentation by Jonathan Hoenig on the heroism of capitalists in their pursuit of financial success based on the practical application of reason, and a talk by one successful and talented neurosurgeon, Joel Franck, M.D., about his experiences and views of the ethical and business aspects of practicing medicine in America today.

The combination of all of these experiences and the camaraderie that developed from our interaction with one another made this a rewarding weekend with benefits that will continue to accrue as each of the participants reflect and act upon the knowledge gained through their participation in the seminar. I for one found that in pursuing the question, "What is Reason?", I found a better way of knowing how to use reason both to pursue further questions and live my life. That is an invaluable lesson.

The Journey

"Wiser by the day"

Socrates' "beautiful city," the political pattern of justice, gradually emerges from the discussion in the first seven books of the Republic. The last, but most significant, feature of the just city to come to light is the figure of the philosopher-king. The nature and goal of philosophy itself is finally treated by Socrates in the Simile of Light in books VI and VII. But are philosophy and politics compatible? Is the just city a realizable goal or is it an unrealizable image, a Utopian dream?

- Herman Sinaiko, introduction to the lecture.

I do not claim to be wise or even particularly knowledgeable about any one thing; however I do try to learn a little every day and thus become a better human being. What brings this thought to mind is a lecture I attended this afternoon by Herman Sinaiko (Professor, Humanities, the College, the University of Chicago). The stated title of his lecture was "A Line, a Cave, and a Beautiful City in Plato's Republic", but I think a shorter, more direct summary title would be "The Journey". He focused on Books 6 and 7 of The Republic in discussing the "overall way the simile of light can be read". I am not going to attempt to discuss the lecture in detail for I am still digesting his words and I have a four page hand out that he asked us to read afterward along with reading, or rereading (in my case) The Republic. The lecture was a demonstration of Plato's project, to the extent it can be demonstrated in a lecture. How does one demonstrate the "dialectic" of Socrates without engaging in the actual process?

He concluded the lecture with a summation of his goal of providing: 1) an account of "The Good", 2) the structure of the "divided line", and 3) the Parable of the Cave. All of this was, in part, an attempt to start (just start) to answer the questions: What is a human being? What is the truth that exists beyond all statements? How do we understand and deal with the inadequacy of our knowledge? Any misinterpretation of this lecture is due to my own limitations which can only be addressed over time, trying each day to engage in "the journey". Hopefully becoming a little wiser, and realizing a little better the breadth of the project.

The Apology of Socrates

Last night I attended a dramatic portrayal of Plato's dialogue, The Apology of Socrates. It was a stunning performance by Yannis Simonides as part of the current Chicago Humanities Festival. Simonides captured the passion and irony of the dialogue, but most of all he displayed the humor in a way that I had never been able to approach in my several readings of the dialogue. The performance brought home to me the true dramatic and poetic nature of Plato's dialogues in a way that can only be accomplished by an impassioned actor. The beauty of the language and style of the dialogue was always present, but it was overshadowed by the moving moral character of Socrates.