Notes on Kant

Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals

by Immanuel Kant

“....Happiness is not an ideal of reason but of imagination, resting solely on empirical grounds, and it is vain to expect that these should define an action by which one could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is really endless.”   

― Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals

To determine(develop) a foundation for a Metaphysics of Morals. Kant proposes that the proper foundation for a metaphysics of morals must be a critical examination of pure practical reason. This is because Moral Laws and their principles are different from practical cognition based on the difference between analytical and empirical thought. Moral philosophy rests on a priori (pure) laws.
Such laws require a power of judgment based on experience.

A metaphysics of such morals is necessary to avoid corruption: i.e. the moral good must not only conform to the moral law but it must also be done for the sake of that law. The metaphysics of morals must investigate the idea and principles of a possible “pure will” - not the actions of human volition.

The method of the work should be an analytical approach that progresses from ordinary knowledge to a supreme principle followed by an analysis and examination of this principle.


In spite of the logic of Kant's argument is it capable of being put into actual practice?
Or, in other words, can there be adherence to a moral law that is done solely for the sake of that law.

A Commonplace Entry

What is Enlightenment?

Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one's own understanding without another's guidance. This nonage is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and lack of courage to use one's own mind without another's guidance. Dare to know! (Sapere aude.) "Have the courage to use your own understanding," is therefore the motto of the enlightenment.

Laziness and cowardice are the reasons why such a large part of mankind gladly remain minors all their lives, long after nature has freed them from external guidance. They are the reasons why it is so easy for others to set themselves up as guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor. If I have a book that thinks for me, a pastor who acts as my conscience, a physician who prescribes my diet, and so on--then I have no need to exert myself. I have no need to think, if only I can pay; others will take care of that disagreeable business for me. Those guardians who have kindly taken supervision upon themselves see to it that the overwhelming majority of mankind--among them the entire fair sex--should consider the step to maturity, not only as hard, but as extremely dangerous. First, these guardians make their domestic cattle stupid and carefully prevent the docile creatures from taking a single step without the leading-strings to which they have fastened them. Then they show them the danger that would threaten them if they should try to walk by themselves. Now this danger is really not very great; after stumbling a few times they would, at last, learn to walk. However, examples of such failures intimidate and generally discourage all further attempts.

Thus it is very difficult for the individual to work himself out of the nonage which has become almost second nature to him. He has even grown to like it, and is at first really incapable of using his own understanding because he has never been permitted to try it. Dogmas and formulas, these mechanical tools designed for reasonable use--or rather abuse--of his natural gifts, are the fetters of an everlasting nonage. The man who casts them off would make an uncertain leap over the narrowest ditch, because he is not used to such free movement. That is why there are only a few men who walk firmly, and who have emerged from nonage by cultivating their own minds.

It is more nearly possible, however, for the public to enlighten itself; indeed, if it is only given freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable. There will always be a few independent thinkers, even among the self-appointed guardians of the multitude. Once such men have thrown off the yoke of nonage, they will spread about them the spirit of a reasonable appreciation of man's value and of his duty to think for himself. It is especially to be noted that the public which was earlier brought under the yoke by these men afterwards forces these very guardians to remain in submission, if it is so incited by some of its guardians who are themselves incapable of any enlightenment. That shows how pernicious it is to implant prejudices: they will eventually revenge themselves upon their authors or their authors' descendants. Therefore, a public can achieve enlightenment only slowly. A revolution may bring about the end of a personal despotism or of avaricious tyrannical oppression, but never a true reform of modes of thought. New prejudices will serve, in place of the old, as guide lines for the unthinking multitude.

This enlightenment requires nothing but freedom--and the most innocent of all that may be called "freedom": freedom to make public use of one's reason in all matters. Now I hear the cry from all sides: "Do not argue!" The officer says: "Do not argue--drill!" The tax collector: "Do not argue--pay!" The pastor: "Do not argue--believe!" Only one ruler in the world says: "Argue as much as you please, but obey!" We find restrictions on freedom everywhere. But which restriction is harmful to enlightenment? Which restriction is innocent, and which advances enlightenment? I reply: the public use of one's reason must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment to mankind. . .

"What is Enlightenment?" - Immanuel Kant

A Theory of Bull

On Bull: Art/Truth/Lying 

a lecture by Michaelangelo Allocca

"One of the most salient features of our culture is that there is so much bull..." was the beginning of the philosopher Harry Frankfurt's seminal 1986 essay. He then observed that while most people feel they can recognize it, there was no theory on it, and attempted to remedy that lack. We will explore the ways that this category occupies a conceptual middle ground between truth and lying, and its overlap with similar borderline categories such as "art," "literature," and "rhetoric." (from the description of the Lecture at The Basic Program web site)

In 1986 the philosopher Harry Frankfurt,  professor emeritus of philosophy at Princeton University, wrote an essay, "On Bullshit".   Originally published in the journal Raritan, the essay was republished as a separate volume in 2005 and became a nonfiction bestseller, spending twenty-seven weeks on the New York Times Best Seller list.   Yesterday Michaelangelo Allocca, Instructor and Chair of the Basic Program of Liberal Education for Adults at the University of Chicago, gave a lecture on this topic.
The topic was introduced as a question of language:  Is Bullshit merely vulgar or indecent or more.  More important is the question raised in the prefatory comments for the lecture: what is the relationship between truth, lying, and bullshit?  There seems to be a cultural standard for the meaning for bullshit (or bull as it is abbreviated for the squeamish).  Most people recognize what is being referred to when somebody announces that "such and such" is bullshit, even if they may not choose to use the term themselves.  According to Professor Frankfurt the meaning of the term bullshit exists in a middle ground somewhere between truth and lying.  Bullshit is certainly not the truth, but its use conveys something that is not quite lying either.
Mr. Allocca referenced an earlier philosopher, Max Black (1909-1988).  Black, a British-American philosopher, was a leading influential figure in analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century. He made contributions to the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mathematics and science, and the philosophy of art.  In one of his essays, "The Prevalence of Humbug", he concludes a rather thorough investigation of the use of the word with this definition:
"HUMBUG: deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody's own thoughts, feelings, or attitudes."
This seems to be somewhat similar to what is referred to by many as bullshit.  Interestingly, Amazon.com pairs Max Black's essay Collection, The Prevalence of Humbug and Other Essays with Harry Frankfurt's essay as two books which are "frequently bought together".
The Oxford English Dictionary recognizes bullshit with a definition that states it is fakery  rather than falsity, with an emphasis on bluffing by talking nonsense.  That definition rings true since it seems reasonable to substitute nonsense for bullshit when describing such instances, especially if one prefers discretion as the better part of valor in the use of the English language.
When considering works of art the realm of bullshit seems to exist when the art is a fake.  Literary fakes and other phony artistic representations would seem also to warrant the designation as bullshit.  Art itself may be considered as inhabiting the middle ground between the truth and lying; one would hope on  higher aesthetic ground than mere bullshit.
The lecture also considered the philosophical aspects of bullshit.  The argument was presented that ethically bullshit is worse than lying.  This is because the liar is concerned with the truth, choosing falsehood instead;  forming an intention to not tell the truth is certainly dependent on knowing what the truth is.  The bullshit "artist", on the other hand, is completely unconcerned with the truth.  However, literature has has a tough time with the philosophers, starting with Plato in his dialogue on The Republic.  Though people would study the arts in Plato's Republic, he did not have much respect for the arts. Art was a copy of reality, which in turn is a pale representation of the exalted Forms. He believed that art did not belong in an ideal state. “No Artists Beyond this Point” would be prominently displayed at the gates of Plato's Republic.  Poetry would be banned as well. It speaks of the heart and inflames emotions, things that further entrench people in the material world. And the objective of the citizenry is to strive for the Ideal and avoid the animal passions that enslave people to this seriously flawed reality. Plato did not see art and poetry as inspiring and uplifting the human spirit. He viewed them as corrupting influences.  Poetry may not tell the truth, but it does not necessarily lie either.  Ethical philosophy may sometimes have a higher standard as in Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals where he puts forward the maxim that right action must be universally true for all. A will is good, Kant says, not because of what it achieves. It is good solely because of its willing. In other words, it must be “good in itself” without regard for consequences.  The truth must be adhered to no matter what the consequences.
What would a good discussion of bullshit be without some reference to political discourse.  Thus there were references to recent political campaigns of which the term malarkey reared it's head--quite appropriately, I believe.  One would hope that most bullshit is harmless, just as those little white lies may be harmless (although Kant would disagree).  The presentation by Mr. Allocca was alternately enlightening and humorous, with enough theoretical weight to lift it above and beyond any realm that inhabits the middle ground between the truth and lying.


On Bullshit by Harry Frankfurt. Princeton University Press, 2005.
The Prevalence of Humbug and Other Essays by Max Black. Cornell University Press, 1985.

Unique Memoir

Biographia Literaria: 

Biographical Sketches of my Literary Life

by Samuel Taylor Coleridge

"I never object to a certain degree of disputatiousness in a young man from the age of seventeen to that of four or five and twenty, provided I find him always arguing on one side of the question." -- Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, Chapter 1

Samuel Taylor Coleridge completed his Biographia Literaria on September 15th in 1815. A sort of intellectual autobiography, the Biographia contains reflections on wide range of philosophical and literary issues. The work is long and seemingly loosely structured, and although there are autobiographical elements, it is not a straightforward or linear autobiography. Instead, it is meditative, with numerous essays on philosophy. In particular, it discusses and engages the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Being fluent in German, Coleridge was one of the first major English literary figures to translate and discuss Schelling, in particular.The concluding paragraph is a speculation on the connection between reason and religious faith, the two a continuum “even as the day softens away into the sweet twilight, and twilight, hushed and breathless, steals into the darkness.” The final sentence contains the sort of ringing (though often obscure or wandering) prose that can be found throughout:
"The upraised eye views only the starry heaven which manifests itself alone: and the outward beholding is fixed on the sparks twinkling in the awful depth, though suns of other worlds, only to preserve the soul steady and collected in its pure act of inward adoration to the great I AM, and to the filial WORD that re-affirmeth it from eternity to eternity, whose choral echo is the universe."
I was reminded of the similarity of the quote above to one of Kant's most frequently quoted passages.  Here is a brief excerpt selected by Paul Guyer:

"In what may be his single most famous passage, the first sentence of which was even inscribed on his tombstone, Immanuel Kant concluded his Critique of Practical Reason (1788) thus: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. I do not seek or conjecture either of them as if they were veiled obscurities or extravagances beyond the horizon of my vision; I see them before me and connect them immediately with the consciousness of my existence. The first starts at the place that I occupy in the external world of the senses, and extends the connection in which I stand into the limitless magnitude of worlds upon worlds, systems upon systems, as well as into the boundless times of their periodic motion, their beginning and continuation. The second begins with my invisible self, my personality, and displays to me a world that has true infinity, but which can only be detected through the understanding, and with which . . . I know myself to be in not, as in the first case, merely contingent, but universal and necessary connection. The first perspective of a countless multitude of worlds as it were annihilates my importance as an animal creature, which must give the matter out of which it has grown back to the planet (a mere speck in the cosmos) after it has been (one knows not how) furnished with life-force for a short time."*

Biographia Literaria by Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Princeton University Press, 1985 (1817).

*Guyer, Paul. "Introduction: The starry heavens and the moral law." The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Ed. Paul Guyer. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Cambridge Collections Online. Cambridge University Press. 

Short Comment on Ethics

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone 

by Immanuel Kant

"One does not have to agree with Kant's conclusions--and I do not--in order to acknowledge this as a great work in the history of philosophical theology.  It is the product of Kant's mature years, an effort to connect his religious thought with the rest of his epoch-making philosophy as presented in his three Critiques." - Morton White


I still remember the refreshing feeling I had when I first read Kant in my Philosophy class on Ethics at the University of Wisconsin. We had just finished reading the utilitarian ethics of John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, so the approach of Kant's categorical imperative seemed much more reasonable in comparison. That said, I am not now nor have I ever been a follower of Kant's ethics, but they are preferable to some ethical principles.
It was with this in mind, and a little reading in Kant since then, that I took up Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone as part of a class on enlightenment literature at The Basic Program of the University of Chicago. This book, published beginning in 1791 - late in Kant's career, is also refreshing in its rational approach to morality. And while I am not convinced by his argument that it is morally reasonable to "act as if there be a God" I could follow his arguments for that approach to morality. The book provides an argument consistent with The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and is worth reading for all interested in ethics and Kant.


Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone by Immanuel Kant. HarperCollins, New York.  2008 (1791)